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Abstract
This work presents an approach to diagnosis to meet the challenging demands of
modern engineering systems. The proposed approach is an architecture that is both
hierarchical and hybrid. The hierarchical dimension of the proposed architecture
serves to mitigate the complexity challenges of contemporary engineering systems.
The hybrid facet of the architecture tackles the increasing heterogeneity of modern
engineering systems. The architecture is presented and realized using a bus represen-
tation where various modeling and diagnosis approaches can coexist. The proposed
architecture is realized in a simulation environment, the Specification Toolkit and
Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). This research also provides important back-
ground information concerning approaches to diagnosis. Approaches to diagnosis are
presented, analyzed, and summarized according to their strengths and domains of
applicability. Important characteristics that must be considered when developing a
diagnostics infrastructure are also presented alongside design guidelines and design
implications. Finally, the research presents important topics for further research.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles P. Coleman
Title: Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Technological advances have pushed the boundary of what modern engineering sys-
tems can accomplish. With the constant increases in computer performance, con-
temporary engineering systems have come to rely heavily on automation for nominal
operation. Automation has played a major role in meeting the performance and func-
tionality demands expected of current engineering systems. However, these advances
have also drastically increased the complexity of common modern systems. Ampli-
fied complexity inevitably introduces an increase in the possible failures of advanced
systems [13]. Even with enhanced quality control processes and other methods aimed
at removing failures from systems, building systems without faults remains an elusive
task. Given the assumption that faults are inevitably present in systems of moderate
complexity, the need to find and correct these faults becomes an integral part of the
performance of such systems. Consequently, modern engineering systems face the
challenging task of diagnosing and accommodating unexpected faults. Furthermore,
all systems should react to faults in a safe, non-destructive manner, so that the system
can continue nominal operation or minimize operational losses.
Application domains where increasing dependence on automation and booming
complexity can be observed include manufacturing, transportation, and space explo-
ration [7,14,16,22,27,29]. Among these application domains, the need for reliability
is extremely high, especially in safety-critical systems and mission-critical systems.
Safety-critical systems are distinguished by potential physical harm to humans. Such
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systems include aviation, manned space exploration, and nuclear power plant opera-
tion. On the other hand, mission-critical systems may not involve potential physical
harm to humans, but reliability in such systems is important because of the high
cost of failure or the high cost of downtime. Such systems include unmanned space
exploration, manufacturing systems, and power systems. The responsibilities put on
safety-critical and mission-critical systems require that they be of utmost reliability
or that, should they fail, they do so gracefully so as to minimize the cost of failure.
Evidently, as a system becomes more complex, diagnosing faults in such a system
also becomes more difficult. Alongside increasing complexity, modern systems also
display increasing heterogeneity [29]. This increase in heterogeneity introduces new
challenges to system diagnosis and modeling. Continuous dynamics and discrete
behavior need to coexist and new failure modes are introduced as a side effect of
heterogeneity and complexity. The combination of disparate components into a single
system introduces failure modes that cannot be isolated to single-component failures
[13]. Not only do components need to be diagnosed at a low-level, but faults arising
from interaction between components must also be captured. As a result, in order
to meet the reliability targets, a reliable diagnostic infrastructure must be able to
handle the complexity and heterogeneity of modern engineering systems.
A survey of the literature presents numerous diagnostic technologies [2,3,8,10,12,
17,24, 27, 29]. The proposed approaches display desirable diagnostic attributes for a
breed of systems. Moreover, certain diagnostic technologies serve a special purpose
very proficiently [19,27]. With the increasing heterogeneity of systems, a comprehen-
sive diagnostics architecture should be flexible enough to combine various diagnostics
technologies into the diagnostics strategy. Combining diagnostics approaches will
enable the system designers to capitalize on the strengths of the various methods.
Another interesting point to note is that the diagnostics strategy is very closely tied
to the modeling of the system. In turn, the system model is dependent on the dynam-
ics of the system. Consequently, as was previously elicited, realistically modeling the
dynamics of modern systems will require some form of hybrid modeling to capture
the full behavior of the system (even if it is to be approximated). As a result, the
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diagnostics strategy will also need to incorporate hybrid capabilities.
This work presents a diagnostics architecture that is both hierarchical and hybrid.
The hierarchical dimension of the architecture helps mitigate the complexity of mod-
ern systems through levels of abstraction. By leveraging levels of abstraction, the
responsibilities of the diagnosis component can be distributed. Moreover, the logic
needed at the top level of the system can also be simplified to a more manageable
level. Hierarchical diagnosis has been studied to a certain extent [6], but the concepts
could be expanded further. Furthermore, hierarchical considerations have not been
fully realized in a complete and flexible hybrid architecture. The concept of hierarchi-
cal abstractions have been around for quite some time in a variety of fields (computer
science, cognitive engineering, mechanical engineering, etc.). The benefits reaped by
other fields can also carry over to the field of diagnostics.
The hybrid dimension of the architecture enables the combination of diagnostics
technologies into a comprehensive diagnostics framework. As Chapter 2 will reveal,
there exists a plethora of approaches to diagnostics. While all of these approaches
have the same goal - finding and accommodating faults in systems - the means by
which they reach their goal can vary significantly. The hope is that a hierarchical
and hybrid architecture can meet the diagnostics needs of increasingly complex and
heterogeneous engineering systems. This work also presents a realization of the con-
ceptual architecture using a data bus architecture and a simulation environment. The
data bus architecture enables universal information dissemination and a plug-and-play
environment for diagnostics technologies. Developing such a flexible framework will
enable system designers to tailor their diagnostics strategy to the needs of their spe-
cific project. Given the wide range of applications of this work, flexibility should be
emphasized. The simulation environment presented enables system designers to test
out their diagnostics strategy during the early phases of system design.
Creating a comprehensive diagnostic strategy for modern engineering systems is
an important challenge. However, developing such a strategy from concept to produc-
tion introduces another set of challenges. Not only is diagnosis development highly
dependent on system development but diagnosis behavior is also difficult to verify
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and validate. Given that many of the target systems for this technology (especially
space exploration systems) operate in highly uncertain environments, validating and
verifying the behavior of the diagnostics strategy becomes of utmost importance.
While it would be impossible to predict all of the possible operating conditions of
such systems, running a series of simulation provides a good starting point for veri-
fying behavior. The reality of most diagnostics technologies is such that most faults
need to be predicted in advance. While this reality unveils inherent limitations in the
technology, a simulation environment can play an important role in estimating the
performance of the system under novel faults.
Other development challenges include how to design systems that are diagnosable
and how to understand how different system designs affect diagnosability. These
challenges are not limited to this work only, but to any work on diagnostics. System
decisions such as what sensors to include in a system affect not only the diagnostics
infrastructure, but the system as a whole. However, if tradeoffs can be evaluated in
an empirical manner (rather than through instinct or past experience), the decisions
on system design and diagnosability implications can be fully understood. Other
important challenges in system design (and not only in diagnostics design) is the idea
of reuse. Reuse has often been cited as a viable means of reducing development cost
and time to production. However, reuse faces multiple challenges that have led to
rethink the benefits of reusing implementation. It has been argued that, perhaps,
reuse has not been targeted at the right phase of the system lifecycle [28]. Design
and specification may provide adequate phases of the lifecycle where reuse could be
viable. Reuse of design and specification can potentially reduce cycle targets if applied
properly [28].
This work also presents an approach to system design [28] that attempts to capi-
talize on design and specification reuse. The reuse methodology can also be applied to
diagnostics design and specification. The proposed approach uses domain specificity
and an executable design environment to enable specification reuse, verification, and
validation. The environment provides a set of system engineering tools that enable
system design and simulation in a component-based framework. In this framework,
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components (in the form of design and specification) can be reused and combined
into a complete system using a plug-and-play philosophy. Reuse can be more success-
fully achieved within a specific domain (such as spacecraft design). Using a similar
methodology, a set of diagnostics best practices for a specific domain can be devel-
oped and tested during the system design phase. This methodology would ease the
development cycle and provide a quantitative basis on which to evaluate diagnos-
tics approaches. Furthermore, this methodology would enable the incorporation of
diagnostics considerations incrementally into a system from the system's inception.
Traditionally, diagnostics implications have been left to the end of the development
cycle as an add-on feature. Delaying the considerations has the adverse effect that
the diagnostics strategy will be limited to the design decisions made earlier in the
system design.
In summary, this work provides a diagnostics strategy to tackle the increasing
demands of modern engineering systems. Furthermore, this work provides a method-
ology and an environment for tackling the challenges of developing and implementing
the diagnostics strategy. This is accomplished through a proposed architecture that
is both hierarchical and hybrid. Furthermore, the proposed architecture is realized
and simulated in a component-based environment. This work does not address di-
agnosability analysis, design iterations for diagnosability, problem size limitations
(tractability), or diagnosis with humans in the loop. While those topics are all im-
portant considerations, they fall outside the scope of this work. However, those topics
are touched upon in relevant chapter and the reader is directed to appropriate sources
for further insight.
This work is divided into 3 chapters, excluding the introduction (this chapter)
and the conclusion. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the field of diagnosis, includ-
ing descriptions of the various approaches that have been suggested in the literature.
Chapter 2 also supplies background information, including definitions, problem sit-
uation, and important considerations. Chapter 3 describes the proposed diagnostics
architecture from a theoretical perspective. The theoretical perspective includes trea-
tise on the hierarchical and hybrid nature of the architecture, as well as the conceptual
11
path into the architecture realization. Chapter 4 provides the physical realization of
the architecture, with an emphasis on how this architecture can be realized in the
proposed simulation environment. Finally, the conclusion (Chapter 5) provides clos-
ing thoughts on the accomplished work, as well as suggestions for how this work can
be further expanded.
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Chapter 2
DIAGNOSIS AND
FAULT-TOLERANCE
Before embarking on a detailed discussion of diagnosis and relevant technologies, it
is imperative to define the key terms. Perhaps the first question to answer should be
What is Diagnosis?. The short answer to this question is diagnosis is the detection
and explanation of malfunctions in a system. The term malfunction can be further
refined to include any unexpected behavior of a system. However, to be able to
define unexpected behavior, a model of expected behavior must be available and
completely understood. Representing expected behavior of a system is the primary
focus of modeling. Fault-tolerance is a concept very closely related to diagnosis. Fault-
Tolerance represents the malfunction resolution to ensure that the system performs
adequately. Not surprisingly, diagnosis and fault-tolerance go hand in hand because
malfunction resolution can only occur once the malfunction has been detected and
identified. Diagnosis and fault-tolerance form an important set of techniques and
concepts that are relevant to many types of engineering systems.
Before expanding on the preliminary definitions of diagnosis and fault-tolerance,
other key terms need to be introduced. The Plant is generally understood to be
the underlying controlled process. This process can be a vehicle (for example a
spacecraft), a chemical process (for example a nuclear reactor), or any other physical
process. The plant is usually fixed and contains natural dynamics that cannot easily
13
Figure 2-1: Generic System Representation
be changed (for example, an airplane is subject to certain aerodynamic forces that
cannot be altered unless the airplane is redesigned). However, the goal of engineering
systems is to get the plant to perform something specific and useful (for example,
make an airplane fly from point a to point b). The way this is accomplished is by
utilizing the plant dynamics in a way such that it meets the intended goals. The
plant is typically equipped with a set of actuators that affect its dynamics. The
component responsible for dictating what the plant should do and how it will do it is
the controller. The controller utilizes the actuators to command the plant dynamics
to achieve the desired goals. For example, in an airplane, the actuators include,
among other components, the engines, the rudder, and the ailerons. Moreover, the
controller needs a way to know the state of the plant's dynamics in order to issue the
appropriate control commands. This is achieved via sensors that relay information
about the various dynamics of the plant. For example, in an airplane, airspeed,
angular rates, and altitude are common sensor measurements used to govern the
control laws. The plant, the controller, and the set of actuators and sensors make up
the System. A generic system architecture is depicted in Figure 2-1.
For a variety of reasons, the controlled element may not behave as the controller
expects. Any deviation from expected nominal behavior of the controller is considered
a fault. Faults can occur in actuators (for example, the aileron of an airplane not
responding to commands), sensors (for example, the airspeed sensor returns corrupted
data) or in the plant (for example, a power unit can go down). Regardless of where
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the fault occurs, the controller must be able to recognize the presence of off-nominal
behavior and react appropriately. Therefore, a fault-tolerant controller should contain
a diagnosis component as well as a fault-adaptation dimension (Figure 2-2. Although
there are numerous available means to adapt to faults in the controlled element (for
example robust controller design) [4], this work is concerned solely with a diagnosis
approach supplemented with an adaptation mechanism.
2.1 Diagnosis
Diagnosis involves a multi-step process also sometimes called health-monitoring. Un-
der nominal operation, the diagnoser remains a passive component of the system.
However, the diagnoser must constantly analyze the behavior of the system to ensure
that faults are detected in a timely manner. The diagnoser has 3 main responsibilities:
* Fault Detection
9 Fault Isolation
9 Fault Identification
Fault detection involves the realization that something wrong has occurred. Al-
though this seems like a simple task, the diagnoser must be careful to discriminate
between the occurrence of a fault and the occurrence of a disturbance. A Disturbance
is a temporary unexpected shift in operating conditions (for example, a gust of wind).
This distinction brings about interesting issues of sensitivity and false alarms. An
ideal diagnoser would detect all faults and give no false alarms. In reality, however,
increasing sensitivity will undoubtedly lead to false alarms. This topic is treated
further in a subsequent section. Fault Isolation takes place after the detection that
something has gone wrong. More specifically, fault isolation aims to attribute the
fault to a specific component or set of components. Although faults can result as a
sequence of failures in multiple components, this work focuses mostly on single fault
diagnosis. Multiple faults are an important and challenging topic and are treated
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briefly in a subsequent chapter. The final part of the diagnosis algorithm involves
fault identification. Fault identification classifies the fault according to its observable
behavior or a predefined fault model. The idea behind these 3 steps is to determine
what has occurred, where it has occurred, and what the implications are (what correc-
tive action may be taken, if any). Naturally, extracting this information is necessary
to determine how the system can recover from the fault. Recovering from the fault
is the responsibility of fault-tolerance.
2.2 Fault-Tolerance
There are a number of approaches to fault-tolerance. Traditionally, fault-tolerance
has been implemented using physical redundancy. Physical redundancy involves du-
plicating physical components so that when a component has been identified as faulty,
the system can switch to a duplicated component and continue its function. However,
given the increasing complexity of modern engineering systems, the number of com-
ponents in a typical system is large and the duplication of every possible component
is realistically not viable (sometimes for financial reasons, sometimes for physical re-
strictions on allowed space and weight). However, for certain critical components,
it is still common to use physical redundancy (power units are a good example). A
different kind of redundancy, Analytical Redundancy, has gained popularity because
it does not require the duplication of expensive components. Analytical redundancy
uses redundancy in the functions of a system. For example, in the case of a two-engine
aircraft, if one of the engine blows out and becomes non-functional, the aircraft can
still function using the remaining engine. However, the thrust differential (between
the blown engine and the functional engine) will impart a moment about the airplane's
yaw axis. The corresponding yawing moment from the differential thrust vectors can
be canceled out using the rudder. Additionally, functionality supplied using engine
differential can be accomplished using the rudder. This type of redundancy and re-
configuration can become quite complicated and must be considered carefully during
the system design phase. Any type of closed-loop automated dynamics brings about
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serious implications (especially in safety-critical systems) and should be analyzed and
tested appropriately.
Another common form of failure-tolerance is the use of a "reset" or "recycle"
command to cycle the faulty component out of its failed state. This type of failure-
tolerance is common in computer systems (a reboot is often necessary after a computer
has been on-line for quite some time). Analogously, this type of failure-tolerance is
well-suited for components that accumulate data over time and can become saturated
(like sensors). If a "reset" command is being issued to a given component, the entire
system must be aware that the component is being recycled and hence is not avail-
able until it is brought back on-line. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a given
component will work correctly even after it has been "reset". It is entirely possible
that the component could be malfunctioning because of causes other than state-based
saturation. If this is the case, the component is identified as "broken" and another
means must be sought to achieve fault-tolerance.
Finally, if the fault cannot be completely explained or if the fault is so severe that
the system cannot adequately recover from it, it is often customary to resort to a
"safe" mode of operation. This type of strategy is necessary for any critical system
because it is impossible to guarantee the performance of the system in the face of
every possible fault (or combination of faults). When in safe mode, the system is put
in a state so that no critical actions can be taken that might endanger the system
or the operators of the system. When a system is in safe mode, it requires outside
assistance to resume operation or simply to decide on what to do next. For example,
the spacecraft Deep Space One entered the safe mode when it had detected that it
had lost its star tracker, a critical component vital to the normal operation of the
spacecraft. Once safe mode was entered, mission operations entered on a long and
complex rescue effort to salvage the spacecraft. Ideally, a controller should be able to
react and adapt to any possible fault. However, in reality, it is usually not possible to
adapt to every possible fault. It is customary to design a system to be able to handle
a set of known failures. The safe mode is a popular way to handle failures that are
not in the set of known faults.
17
Figure 2-2: Fault-Tolerant Controller Architecture
2.3 Faults, Fault Types, and Fault Models
A fault has been defined as a malfunction of a system. While this definition is accu-
rate, the broadness of the definition makes it difficult to specify in great details what
the possible faults of a system are. As mentioned in a preceding paragraph, in order
to detect unexpected behavior, a model of expected behavior must be available. This
model typically takes the form of a specification document, mathematical equations,
or a plethora of other representations. Faults are then understood as observed be-
havior that contradicts the expected behavior as explained by the model. Faults can
come in many flavors and must be further refined to enable deeper analysis.
Faults in a system can be divided into two main types - abrupt or discrete faults,
and gradual or incipient faults. An example is in order to distinguish between these
two different types of faults. Imagine a simple pipe/valve system. The valve regulates
the flow of liquid through the pipe. If the valve is closed, no liquid flows. If the valve is
open, liquid can flow. The first type of fault, abrupt or discrete fault, encompasses all
faults that have a discrete set of states. If we consider the valve example and restrict
the valve to a discrete set of states (OPEN or CLOSED), possible abrupt faults would
be FAILED-OPEN and FAILEDCLOSED. These faults would reflect that the valve
is expected to be open/closed (based on commands) but is in fact closed/open (the
opposite state to the expected state). Since we assume that the valve cannot be in
any other state when it fails, we can say that the valve is subject to two abrupt faults.
The second type of fault, incipient or gradual fault, describes faults that degrade over
time in a continuous fashion. Referring back to the valve example, if we suppose
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that the valve can lose its stanching ability, we can describe an incipient fault. More
specifically, when the valve is closed, we expect that no liquid passes through it.
If after some operational amount of time, the valve starts eroding, a small amount
of liquid can pass through it when it is in the closed position. Furthermore, the
longer the valve is in operation, the more it erodes away and loses stanching ability.
Gradually, the amount of liquid that can pass through gets larger and larger such
that, eventually, the valve no longer serves its purpose. Typical incipient faults are
not reversible and will only get worse as time elapses.
Faults can be further characterized based on how they manifest themselves in the
system. Intermittent faults can be thought of in terms of the abrupt and incipient
faults. When the two types of faults were presented, it was assumed that once the
faults reveal themselves, the relevant component stays in the faulty state. Intermit-
tent faults are different because they tend to reveal themselves periodically and to
oscillate between faulty and nominal behavior. Referring to the valve example, for
non-intermittent faults, if the valve enters the FAILEDCLOSED state, it will stay
in that state unless some corrective action is taken. Similarly, if the valve has eroded
enough that it is no longer useful, it will stay in a not useful (failed) state or get worse
until corrective action is taken. However, intermittent faults describe faults that can
appear and disappear. Referring back to the valve example, if the valve were to os-
cillate between OPEN and CLOSED, the observed behavior would be an oscillation
between OPEN and FAILED-CLOSED or between CLOSED and FAILEDOPEN
depending on the expected behavior. These types of faults are especially difficult to
diagnose because different samplings of the behavior yield different answers. Never-
theless, these types of faults reveal themselves in regular patterns so that a careful
analysis of the history of the system behavior can isolate the patterns and correctly
diagnose the fault [19]. Another characterization of faults is that of transient faults.
In certain systems, faults may occur at a specific time, but the fault does not produce
anomalous behavior until much later after the fault has occurred. The time latency
makes the diagnosis problem even more challenging since the location of the observed
anomalous behavior is typically far removed from the occurrence of the fault. Tran-
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sient faults are hard to detect until it is already too late and are even harder to isolate
to individual components.
One of the main challenges of diagnosis and fault-tolerance is that faults are often
novel. If one could predict the future and know what all the possible faults could be,
the problem wouldn't be as complex and as interesting as it is. Unfortunately, the
reality is such that one cannot predict the future. However, historical information
and experience, especially in fields that have matured through a series of mishaps,
can dictate what potential faults can be and how they can be remedied. It might be
argued that if one knew what the faults will be, one can design the system in such
a way that the fault will not occur. While this statement is partly true for certain
faults, many of the possible faults cannot be easily erased through design. Especially
for faults that result from a highly uncertain operating environments. Furthermore, it
is also likely that faults are present because of system design and cannot be eradicated
without completely redesigning the system. However, those faults remain important
and must be accounted for. One way to identify certain faults is to have a predefined
model of what the behavior of the system would be if the given fault were to occur. As
a result, if the relevant behavior is observed, the fault is assumed to have occurred.
The classification of such behavior is often called a fault model or fault signature.
Often times, it is customary to link the fault model to a predefined solution, if pos-
sible (in the form of a rule-based system). Care should be taken to ensure that the
observed behavior can only result from the occurrence of the fault and not from some
other combination of events. If the behavior is explainable in other ways, automated
resolution of the problem could lead to more catastrophic behavior. Failures and fault
models form the basis for many of the approaches to diagnosis and fault-tolerance.
2.4 Modeling
As mentioned in previous sections, diagnosis concerns itself with the detection and
explanation of unexpected behavior of a system (faults). In order to perform this task,
the diagnoser must have a model of what is considered nominal behavior. Often times,
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the model takes an analytical form either as a logical model (for discrete dynamics)
or as a mathematical equation (for continuous dynamics). The model exists as a
redundant system to the actual physical system. The model is typically fed all of the
inputs that are fed to the controlled element. The model then predicts the expected
outputs. The predicted outputs are periodically compared with the measured outputs
of the physical system (from sensor measurements) 2-2. If a discrepancy is observed
between predicted and measured output, a failure is said to have occurred and the
diagnoser will go through a series of steps (called an algorithm) to explain the fault.
The details of these algorithms will be explained in the following section. However, it
is important to note the importance of modeling and the importance of sensors. The
variables measured by sensors are often termed the observables. The granularity of the
model and the granularity of the observables will dictate what can be diagnosed and
what cannot be diagnosed. This point must be emphasized early in the design stages
because the choice of sensors greatly affects the diagnosability characteristics of the
system. Furthermore, the model used by the diagnoser must also receive great care
in how detailed the behavior of each component should be. These considerations are
extremely important and will be treated in more depth in the Architecture Realization
Chapter (Chapter 4).
2.5 Approaches to Diagnosis
The approaches to diagnosis all have the common task of detecting and explaining
faults in a system. However, the means utilized to achieve this task differ greatly
among the approaches to diagnosis. The differences often stem from the model used
to represent the behavior of the system. The model will dictate what algorithms
can be applied and how those algorithms will function. Given the heterogeneity of
system dynamics, there is no single way to model a system. Consequently, most of the
listed approaches have abilities to diagnose certain types of faults but no approach
is positioned to encompass all types of faults. In order to adequately model typical
modern engineering systems, existing approaches must be mixed and matched. The
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listed approaches encompass the most relevant approaches for the context of this
work. Other approaches are certainly possible. The presented list provides a feasible
set that is in no way complete. For the sake of brevity, approaches not relevant to
this work have been touched upon in the analysis section, but they have not been
presented in details in this section. For further details about the listed approaches or
other possible approaches, the reader should consult source [4].
2.5.1 Direct Observation
Perhaps the most basic form of diagnosis is that of direct observation. To explain
direct observation, consider the AND gate in Figure 2-3. The behavior of the AND
gate can be easily described using a truth table. Inputs and outputs can take any of
two discrete values (1 or 0). If both inputs have a value of 1, the output will have a
value of 1. Any other combination of inputs will yield an output value of 0. If sensors
are available to measure the values of input 1, input 2, and the value of the output,
the diagnosis can be performed directly. For example, if it is observed that input 1
and input 2 have a value of 1 but that the output has a value of 0, the diagnoser can
automatically conclude that the AND gate is broken. Furthermore, it can be assumed
that the AND gate is broken with its output being 0 regardless of the inputs (this
preliminary conclusion can be later revised after more behavior is observed). The
direct observation approach can include more details such as how long the output
has had a value of 0 to reflect the potential latency in reaction to changing inputs.
Direct observation represents the most reliable form of diagnosis and perhaps the
most simple. Detecting and isolating failures is trivial in direct observation diagnosis,
but the corrective action still needs to be carried out.
However, unfortunately, direct observation is typically not possible in practice
because not all inputs and all outputs are measured by sensors. The complexity
of most systems prevents this possibility. Since direct observation is usually not
possible, the concept brings about the important topic of partial observability. In all
complex systems, the state of the system is not completely observable and must be
inferred based on the available information (sensor measurements). Often times the
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Figure 2-3: A Simple AND Gate
inference mechanism poses an important challenge because there typically isn't only
one possible diagnosis given a set of observations. The challenge is to determine the
most likely possible diagnosis (or system state) given the evidence and to take the
appropriate action. However, acting on the inferred state should take into account
that the inferred state might be erroneous. If further evidence becomes available and
contradicts the previous inference, a new inference should be carried out. This type of
functionality involves non-determenism and probabilistic analysis and is the subject
of the following subsection.
2.5.2 Probabilistic Inference
Probabilistic Inference, sometimes called Bayesian Inference [1,11], refers to the pro-
cess of reaching a conclusion based on a most likely criteria (highest probability of
being right) given the available evidence (observations). This method contrasts with
direct observation, which is completely deterministic. The term probabilistic covers
the fact that probabilities are assigned to potential failures of components. As infor-
mation becomes available through sensor measurements, the probabilities of failure
of relevant components are updated. If unexpected behavior is observed, the com-
ponent with the highest probability of failure is inferred to have failed. The initial
probabilities of failure can be allocated based on historical data or test data although
this type of information is not always available. Nevertheless, even though historical
information might not be available, probabilities still need to be applied to failure
events. The assignment of probabilities is a popular debate because it is often done
subjectively [13]. Even though the assignment of probabilities may not be perfect,
probabilistic inference remains one of the few approaches that provides a solution to
the partial observability challenge.
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The probabilistic inference approach is used for networked components that can-
not be directly observed. Figure 2-4 represents a simplified network of components
with partial observability. Although this example is somewhat of a toy problem, it
nevertheless illustrates the ideas and applications behind the algorithm. The indi-
vidual gates in the network can be construed as components within a system or as
subcomponents within a component. The level of granularity selected by the system
designer does not affect the functionality of the algorithm.
Returning to the example of Figure 2-4, the numbers assigned to each gate are
assumed (or known) probabilities of failures. Even though some of the components
appear to be identical, different probabilities are assigned to each component in order
to augment the relevance of the example. The observables are the Inputs (numbered 1
through 6) and the Outputs (numbered 1 through 2). The values of the intermediate
steps between Inputs and Outputs are not directly observable. However, a truth table
for the network is available for the model of the system. Although the truth table is
too long to print in its entirety, some important characteristics can be highlighted:
" If Input 1 or Input 2 (or both) is 0, Output 1 is 0
* If Input 3 and Input 4 are 0, Output 1 is 0
" Otherwise, Output 1 is 1
* If Input 5 and Input 6 are 1, Output 2 is 1
" If Input 3 or Input 4 (or both) is 1, Output 2 is 1
* Otherwise, Output 2 is 0
The model relationships having been established and the observables having been
defined, different failure scenarios can be analyzed. For the first scenario, let's assume
that Input 1, Input 2, and Input 3 have been observed to be 1. Additionally, Output
1 has been observed to be 0 and Output 2 has been observed to be 1. Given the
logical relationship between the components, Output 1 should be 1. Consequently, a
fault is inferred to have occurred. The algorithm should narrow down the candidates
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for failures to AND 1, AND 3, and OR 1 (given the logical relationship). How the
discrimination between the candidates occurs depends on the algorithm. A simple
algorithm would pick the candidate with the highest probability of failure from the
candidate set (in this case OR 1). A smarter algorithm would realize that since the
Output 2 observable is consistent with the model, OR 1 must be functioning correctly
(especially if it is observed that Input 5 or Input 6 is 0). If this is the case, OR 1 would
be eliminated from the candidate set and a new potential candidate would be selected
based on probability (in this case, it would be AND 3). This example is fairly simple.
In more complex examples, more probabilities may need to be calculated based on
the observables and the model. In all cases though, it is highly unlikely that the fault
can be isolated to a single component without resorting to probability analysis for
discrimination. Constraint suspension, the topic of the next section, takes a similar
approach without the probability analysis.
The approach presented above represent an oversimplification of the probability
concept known as Bayesian Inference. However, the ideas presented are similar to the
basic concepts behind Bayesian Inference. The core idea is to treat observable values
as random variables with probability distributions. The probability distributions (and
consequently inferred probabilities) are updated as information becomes available.
The original probabilities are typically called "a priori" probabilities and updated
probabilities are typically called "a posteriori" probabilities. The process of updating
probabilities is carried out using Bayes' theorem (where the term Bayesian Inference).
For a more detailed treatise of Bayesian Inference and probability concepts, the reader
is referred to [1, 11].
2.5.3 Constraint Suspension
Constraint suspension combines the benefits of direct observation and probabilistic
inference while trying to avoid the drawbacks. Constraint suspension is best applied
to logic systems or systems where the constraints of each component can be clearly
identified and abstracted. The main idea behind constraint suspension is to iteratively
suspend each component's constraints in the model (in the case of a logic system,
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Figure 2-4: A Network of AND Gates and OR Gates
the truth table), and to verify if suspending a component's constraints renders the
observables consistent with the model. If suspending a component's constraints causes
consistency, that component is considered a failure candidate. Constraint suspension
typically stops after generating the set of potential candidates. As in the case of
probabilistic inference, it is possible that more than one candidate can explain the
observed system behavior. How candidates are discriminated amongst each other
is often left to further analysis. However, there can be a degree of suspicion based
on how many rows in the truth table each suspension rules out. This process of
discrimination is analogous to the discrimination process for probabilistic inference
and is not guaranteed to be exact.
Referring back to the example problem depicted in figure 2-4, the algorithm can be
illustrated. Iteratively suspending each component's constraints, the candidates for
the faults remain AND 1, AND 3, and OR 1. Although the candidates are the same
for both approaches, the conclusion is reached in a much more different fashion in each
case. In the probabilistic case, candidates are ranked in terms of their probability
of failure. In the constraint suspension case, candidates aren't ranked, but they are
put into a set based on iteratively relaxing constraints. In the end, as is the case
for many of the diagnostics problems, there is no unique answer to the diagnosis
question and the best option left to the diagnostics infrastructure is to suggest a
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most likely candidate. Further example could be drafted where probabilistic analysis
and constraint suspension could yield different results (based on ranking), but the
supplied example conveys the main ideas behind the approach. Both of the explained
approaches work better on systems that can be modeled using discrete logic or systems
that exhibit discrete dynamics. For systems modeled using continuous dynamics, a
different approach must be considered.
2.5.4 Signal Processing
Although discrete logic can adequately model the dynamics of a wide range of systems,
many systems also contain continuous dynamics. The most obvious type of continuous
dynamics is a simple differential equation. The model of the system is thus fairly
simple and the diagnostics task is also fairly simple granted that the necessary outputs
can be readily measured. If the output of the system (in this case the dependent
variable of the differential equation) can be observed, the continuous dynamics can
be analyzed in some depth. Numerous approaches have been suggested for how to
diagnose continuous signals [4]. However, most of these approaches consist of 2 similar
steps:
" Residual Generation
" Residual Analysis and Decision-Making
The residual generation stage is analogous to the model/observation comparison
stage of the probabilistic inference approach. More specifically, the measured signal is
processed and subtracted from the predicted signal from the model. However, because
the residual generation will compare a real-time signal with a model, sampling time
comes into effect. Furthermore, noise considerations are important when processing
continuous signals. A plethora of approaches dealing with noise and stochastic signals
is available in the literature (Kalman Filter, Parity Space, etc.) [4]. However, for the
scope of this work, the residual generation phase will be a simple comparison between
measured output from the sensor and the model output. Noise considerations will be
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excluded. The second stage, analysis and decision-making deals with what action is to
be taken given the residual's signature. Once again, this process can be very complex
by incorporating continuous signals from various sensors and tracking the error (or
integrals of the errors or derivatives of the errors over time). For the sake of this
work, a simple approach is taken. A decision is reached by specifying an acceptable
error band (typically denoted epsilon) and if the residual exceeds the error band,
a fault is assumed to have occurred. Because signal processing and mathematical
manipulations of signals go beyond the scope of this work, fault causes will be assigned
directly to error bands that are too large. For example, for an airplane, giving an
input to the rudder should enact a certain yaw moment. If the yaw moment measured
by gyros and the yaw moment predicted by the model differ by too wide a margin,
a failure in the rudder is assumed. The actual failure mode can be determined using
fault models or can be assigned directly (for example, assume that the rudder is
stuck in the neutral position if the measured response is very small). Diagnosis of
continuous systems represents a very important branch of diagnosis and fault-tolerant
control. Many of the systems targeted by the field of control engineering are systems
modeled using differential equations. Consequently, a plethora of refined approaches
are available in the literature [3,4,8]. However, with the increase use of computers
to implement functionality, differential equations are not sufficient to describe the
behavior of most systems. Discrete Event Systems provide a means to model systems
to reflect the state-based dynamics of many contemporary systems.
2.5.5 Discrete Event Systems
To better understand Discrete Event Systems, some preliminary definitions should be
given. A Discrete Event System (DES) is a discrete-state, event-driven system, that is,
its state evolution depends entirely on the occurrence of asynchronous discrete events
over time [5]. More specifically, discrete event systems are a way to model state-based
systems that have well-defined transition rules between each state. Discrete event
systems use automata as the basis for modeling. The automata can take on many
of the traditional properties linked to automata (deterministic vs. stochastic, timed
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Figure 2-5: A Simple Automaton
vs. untimed, etc.). For the sake of this work, only finite-state deterministic automata
will be considered. This limitation is not very restrictive because it corresponds
adequately with the simulation platform that will be outlined in Chapter 4. Moreover,
stochastic properties can be captured using the probabilistic inference described in a
previous section. Also, non-determinism of an automaton can also be removed with
a corresponding deterministic automaton [9]. For a brief review of automata theory,
a simple automaton is presented in figure 2-5. The presented automaton has 3 states,
(ON, OFF, FAILED), and can be cycled between each state using a set of 2 commands
(TURNON, TURNOFF). The FAIL transitions (to the FAILED state) is triggered
using a set of sensor readings and assumptions about what state the automaton should
be in. Moreover, there can be more states depending on whether failure modes are
available and the diagnoser needs to differentiate between each failure mode (might
be necessary if reconfiguration is required).
The automaton has a start state, the OFF state. The automaton will be switched
to the FAILED state only if it is detected that the automaton does not behave as it
should (by the diagnoser component). Performing diagnosis on discrete event systems
has been heavily explained in a number of sources [5, 12, 23,24]. The approach can
be summarized as a series of 4 steps [23]:
1. Component Modeling
2. Component Composition
3. Creating a Sensor Map for the System
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4. Revise Model Transitions to Reflect the Sensor Map
The first step involves the modeling of individual components. The second step,
component composition, involves combining individual components into a single model
automaton. The resultant model is a complete automaton that reflects the total be-
havior of the system. The third step involves creating a sensor map using the set
of available sensors of the system. The failure events of the system are modeled as
states and sensor readings are defined for each state of the system. Transitions to
failed states are achieved via unique combinations of sensor readings (from the global
sensor map).
To better illustrate the discrete event systems approach, an example is given.
Consider a simple pump/valve system (adapted from [23]). The pump and the valve
are connected via a pipe. The pump causes fluid to flow through the pipe and the
valve governs whether the fluid flows all the way through the pipe or if it stops at the
valve. The pump has 4 states (ON, OFF, FAILEDON, FAILED-OFF) and the valve
has 4 states (OPEN, CLOSED, FAILED-OPEN, FAILEDCLOSED). The system is
also equipped with a sensor at the pump and a sensor at the valve (readings are
HIGH or LOW depending on the presence of pressure at the sensor). If the pump
in ON and the valve is OPEN, the pressure sensor at the valve should reads HIGH.
Similarly, if the pump is OFF, the sensors at both the pump and the valve should
read LOW regardless of the state of the valve.
A few failure scenarios can be considered. If the pump is assumed to be OFF
and the valve is assumed to be OPEN (based on command history), but the sensor
at the pump reads HIGH and the sensor at the valve reads LOW, it can be assumed
that the pump has entered the FAILED-ON state and the valve has entered the
FAILED-CLOSED state. Other similar failure scenarios can be considered. This
example illustrates one of the main ideas behind this type of diagnosis. To perform
this type of diagnosis successfully, unique failure signatures are necessary. For the
presented failure scenario, if the sensor at the pump reads HIGH and the pump
is assumed to be off, the assumed failure for the pump is FAILEDON. No other
failure can cause this signature. To successfully model and diagnose systems using
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discrete event systems, fault models must be known. But because this modeling
approach uses a discrete set of states (including failure states), the diagnosable faults
will be limited to the faults in the set of states. While this limitation might seem
negative, discrete event systems nevertheless provide the basis for modeling many
modern systems. Furthermore, they provide the ability to preform diagnosability
analysis, a characteristic not easily achieved using the other approaches.
2.6 Diagnosability
Diagnosability is an important concept for the analysis and design of complex engi-
neering systems. Diagnosability can be defined as the unique identification of failure
events given available observations (sensor readings). In other words, diagnosability
concerns itself with what can and cannot be diagnosed given a system design. Aside
from the discrete event systems approach to diagnosis, the presented approaches to
diagnosis do not directly address the notion of diagnosability. Probabilistic analysis
cannot directly assert diagnosability because of the stochastic nature of the analysis.
However, constraint suspension allows for diagnosability analysis if the fault signa-
tures are known. Furthermore, constraint suspension can also enable a certain level
of diagnosability analysis without fault models. For example, using iterative con-
straint suspension, it is possible to determine whether the suspension of constraints
of 2 components lead to the same set of constraints being discarded. If diagnosability
analysis can be performed during the system design phase, useful design decisions
can be made iteratively. A useful design platform would enable a system designer
to determine diagnosability of a design and to understand diagnosability effects of
adding/removing a sensor in the system. Moreover, a useful design platform would
also enable a system designer to determine what faults would need to be diagnosed
and to supply a set of sensors required to enable the correct diagnosis of the desired
faults. Although diagnosability analysis is an important concept, such analysis will
be treated only briefly in the context of this work.
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2.7 Other Considerations
The given definitions capture the basic concepts behind diagnosis and fault-tolerance.
Furthermore, the suggested approaches also provide a good overview of the techniques
used to achieve the desired tasks. However, the information presented in this chapter
still does not address all important considerations. First and foremost, most of the
listed approaches have been presented only in the context of single failures. The
theory of how to diagnose multiple failures is a very important topic. For some of the
approaches (for example discrete event systems), diagnosing multiple failures comes
more naturally than for other approaches (for example signal processing techniques).
For other approaches, like probabilistic analysis, the possible combination of failures
increases the required analysis and calculations considerably. Not only do conditional
probabilities need to be calculated, but joint conditional probabilities must also be
considered (including pairwise, triplewise, etc.). How to diagnose multiple failures
remains an important and interesting topic although it falls outside the scope of this
work.
Aside from multiple failures, trajectory tracking poses another interesting chal-
lenge to the diagnosis task. Trajectory tracking involves keeping a time history of the
system at hand so that the system state can be inferred using current information
and past information about the system. Trajectory tracking is especially important
for diagnosis approaches that rely on a most likely state inference approach (like
Bayesian Inference). Since multiple states can be inferred at any one time, the non-
determinism must be tracked over time. This way, when more information becomes
available and the most likely state turns out to be erroneous, the next most likely
state can be inferred using current and past information. How many trajectory to
track and how much information to track is highly dependent on the system at hand.
Nevertheless, trajectory tracking is an important characteristic of inference engines
such as Livingstone [29].
Furthermore, this work and the corresponding diagnosis approaches refer to au-
tomated diagnosis, that is, diagnosis carried out by a computer. However, for many
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engineering systems, the automated diagnosis task is complemented with a human
operator or supervisor. For most engineering systems, closed loop fault tolerance
can be harmful, especially in the face of uncertainty. Typically, the automation will
perform a preliminary diagnosis and further action (further analysis and problem
resolution) is often left to the human component of the system. An example of di-
agnosis with humans in the loop is when a system enters the safe mode after it has
detected an unknown failure. Moreover, for novel faults and more complex faults
that cannot be diagnosed using automation, the diagnosis task is often performed
by the human supervisor. Other important considerations for system diagnostics in-
clude human factors considerations, human-computer interaction considerations, and
cognitive engineering considerations. The human dimension of diagnostics is an im-
portant problem that has not received much attention. A comprehensive solution
would incorporate the human operator as an integral component of the diagnostics
infrastructure design. Some of the same concepts of automated diagnosis apply to
diagnosis with humans in the loop (for example, diagnosability). However, the infor-
mation needs to be presented to the human in a way conducive to readability and
human analysis.
2.8 Analysis and Summary
The presented list of approaches to diagnosis does not comprise a comprehensive
inventory of available possibilities. Moreover, the approaches presented have been
treated somewhat superficially for the sake of conciseness. The most important prop-
erties have been exposed for the context of this work. For a more in-depth treatise
of these approaches or for a more comprehensive list of approaches, sources [2,4, 5]
provide a good starting point for further investigation. Nevertheless, the approaches
presented represent an adequate set for the architecture presented in this work. The
behavior of most engineering systems can be modeled using a mix of state machines
(automata), equations, and truth tables. Consequently, incorporating discrete logic,
state-based behavior, and continuous dynamics into the architecture will prove a fea-
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Table 2.1: Approaches to Diagnosis
Technique Main Strengths
Model-Based Artificial Discrete Logic Systems,
Intelligence Techniques [29] Abrupt Faults
Discrete-Event Systems [12] State-based Systems,
Abrupt Faults
Principal Component Analysis [19] Intermittent Faults
Knowledge-Based Systems [26] Systems Difficult to Model,
Neural Networks [2] Incorporating Historical and
Expert Systems Expert Knowledge
Fuzzy Logic [3,10] Systems with Uncertainty,
Systems with Vagueness,
Capturing Human Reasoning
Probabilistic Reasoning [11,20] Systems with Uncertainty
Signal Processing Techniques [8] Continuous Systems,
Gradual (Incipient) Faults
sible modeling and diagnosis basis. Some of the approaches not covered in this work
include approaches based on Fuzzy Logic, Statistical approaches (Principal Compo-
nent Analysis being the most widely known), Knowledge-Based Systems, and Neural
Networks. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the surveyed approaches, including their
strengths and what types of faults they are most well-suited to diagnose. Moreover,
since modeling is a big part of the problem, the strengths also include the types of
systems typically targeted by the approaches.
It must be reemphasized that this table does not represent all of the possible
approaches to diagnosis and modeling. However, these approaches were extracted
from a recent survey of the literature on diagnosis. Now that a strong basis has
been established on diagnosis and fault-tolerance, the architecture to include these
approaches can be drafted. It must also be reemphasized that the listed approaches
is not intended to represent the best approaches to diagnosis. As the summary ta-
ble illustrates, all of these approaches have their redeeming values and the choice of
approach is often a matter of expertise and preference. The purpose of this work is
to provide a framework that is comprehensive yet flexible so that approaches can be
mixed-and-matched at will depending on expertise and preference. It is also impor-
tant to repeat that diagnostics is an important consideration in any system but that
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the level of sophistication is also highly dependent on expertise and mission needs.
Many systems contain a very rudimentary set of diagnostics capabilities and it serves
the purpose very well. Other systems, however, require more detailed diagnostics
capabilities and the diagnoser can become quite convoluted. Whatever the project
requirements, the hope is that the proposed architecture can meet the requirements
of most diagnostics projects. Chapter 3 details the proposed architecture in more
details.
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Chapter 3
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
Chapter 2 covered the basics of diagnosis and fault-tolerance. Furthermore, Chapter
2 provided a survey of approaches to diagnosis and summarized the strengths of
the proposed approaches alongside important considerations for system design. This
chapter will describe the proposed diagnostics architecture for the component-based
framework. The proposed architecture contains 2 main characteristics - a hierarchical
decomposition to ease some of the complexity, and a hybrid dimension to enable the
combination of multiple of the proposed approaches. Furthermore, this chapter also
drafts the conceptual architecture's topology in the form of a data bus architecture.
The data bus architecture will prove adequate for the realization in the simulation
environment. In summary, this chapter provides the conceptual architecture that will
form the basis for the architecture realization, presented in Chapter 4.
3.1 Hierarchical Architecture
The proposed architecture uses an approach to system decomposition based on three
levels, as outlined in [15, 28]. The system is first decomposed into subsystems and
furthermore into components. The three levels can then be identified as system-level,
subsystem-level, and component-level [15]. This system decomposition is typical of
spacecraft systems and other large engineering systems. The diagnostics strategy
performs tasks at each of these levels to obtain a complete picture of the state of the
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Figure 3-1: Hierarchical Architecture
system. The extracted state involves a complete description involving information
from the small (component-level) and the large (system-level). The main idea behind
the hierarchical strategy is to utilize component-level diagnosis to perform system-
level diagnosis.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the proposed hierarchical architecture. At the lowest level,
each component is equipped with a diagnoser that monitors the health and status
of the relevant component. Each subsystem is also equipped with a diagnoser whose
responsibility is to capture faults that may result from interaction between compo-
nents. Finally, a supervisor reigns over the subsystems and uses information from
both the component and subsystem diagnosers to perform system-level diagnosis and
coordination. The main idea is to distribute the diagnostic responsibilities across the
different levels to keep the complexity of the supervisor to a manageable level. For
example, the supervisor does not need to concern itself with implementation details
of single components. Those details are the responsibilities of the diagnosers at the
component level. The supervisor is primarily concerned with relationships among
components and subsystems, and only such information is propagated through the
various levels.
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Other advantages of providing diagnosis at various levels allow the diagnostic
strategy to be included early in the design phase. By incorporating diagnostic con-
siderations early in the system design, the proper sensors and interfaces between levels
can be determined. This strategy will ease the process of building systems that are
diagnosable. This approach is contrasted with a traditional approach of incorporating
diagnosis as a final step of the system design once the system architecture has already
been finalized [15]. Once the diagnostic considerations and the system architecture
have been finalized, communication interfaces across the different levels of the system
can be derived. Diagnostic capabilities can then be developed in parallel in accor-
dance with the agreed interfaces between each level. Furthermore, decomposing the
diagnostics infrastructure into levels might ease reusability.
There are obvious challenges with implementing hierarchical diagnosis successfully.
Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction can be challenging. Selecting a level too
coarse might not provide the appropriate information required by the upper layers.
Conversely, providing too much information across layers would negate the benefits
of the hierarchical decomposition. A good algorithm for deciding on the information
propagated across layers would provide a systematic way to determine the informa-
tion dissemination requirements. The information requirements are highly dependent
on the system at hand and the specific faults that will be diagnosed. Nevertheless,
a typical abstraction would use a black box approach and abstract the information
between layers as a set of inputs and outputs. Furthermore, distributing the diagnos-
tic responsibilities can also impend control logic modularity compared to centralized
diagnosis; but the flexibility of the architecture enables the system designer to se-
lect the appropriate amount of responsibility to be allocated to the various levels.
The delegation of responsibility can range from complete centralization to complete
decentralization.
The hierarchical decomposition will also ease the selection of what information
must be measured and propagated through each layer. However, the distribution of
diagnostic responsibilities represents only a subset of the features of the proposed
architecture. The other important facet, hybrid diagnosis, provides an even more
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important set of facilities. The hybrid diagnosis capabilities can also be eased through
the use of hierarchical decomposition.
3.2 Hybrid Architecture
The hierarchical architecture presented in the previous subsection provides the system
designer ways to mitigate the complexity of diagnosing a large system. The mitigation
is achieved through abstraction and system decomposition. However, even through
abstractions, diagnosing a system composed of heterogeneous components is not a
trivial task. The inherent difficulty in hybrid diagnosis lies in the difficulty of deriving
a single model of the system to be diagnosed (or to derive a model using a single
modeling methodology). For obvious reasons, deriving a model of a system often
proves the most difficult task of diagnosis [6]. The model must serve the purpose of not
only providing an adequate representation of the behavior of the system, but it must
also lend itself to the type of analysis that the diagnoser seeks to achieve. The modern
breed of complex systems exposes a level of heterogeneity that is extremely challenging
to capture within a single model or a single modeling methodology. Furthermore,
certain aspects of a model are too difficult to model, such as non-linear aspects; in
this case, an explicit model of the system is not possible, and another approach must
be considered [2]. In other cases, a model of the system might already exist but the
available model might not yield itself to the desired type of diagnostic analysis.
A survey of the literature on diagnosis illustrates the depth and breadth of the
modeling and diagnosis techniques that have been attempted [2-4, 8, 10, 12, 27, 29].
Some approaches have also attempted to combine quantitative and qualitative ap-
proaches to diagnosis [2, 3, 24]. But no approach has situated a diagnostic strategy
in a comprehensive and flexible framework for heterogeneous systems with various
failure modes. For industrial systems, this requirement is becoming increasingly im-
portant. Chapter 2 outlined some of the important approaches in the context of this
work. As a reminder, Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 summarizes the surveyed approaches
and their strengths.
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The proposed architecture provides a comprehensive yet flexible framework that
enables the coexistence of numerous diagnosis approaches. The principal idea is to
enable the system designer to select the appropriate approach based on diagnostics
requirements. For example, a heterogeneous system can utilize a model-based arti-
ficial intelligence technique to diagnose control logic failures [29] alongside a signal
processing technique to diagnose incipient faults [8]. Combining approaches enables
the strategy to capitalize on the strengths of available approaches while allowing ap-
proaches to complement one another. This strategy also allows the use of existing
models if they are available.
The flexibility of the hybrid architecture allows a large number of combinations
of diagnosis approaches. The vast space of approaches can lead to confusion about
what combination of approaches is best-suited to accomplish a specific diagnosis task.
Experience with diagnosis implementations in industrial systems suggests that domain
specificity can yield a set of best practices in certain domains [7,16,19, 25, 27]. By
capturing domain knowledge and experience, diagnostic strategy specifications can be
drafted and reused [15]. To enable this type of realization, the proposed architecture
must be comprehensive and flexible. The architecture should provide a platform
where domain specific sub-architectures can be derived and documented in a reusable
fashion. This topic is treated further in a subsequent section.
Drafting such a flexible framework is extremely powerful but can lead to increased
system complexity. The goal of the strategy is not to introduce undue complexity into
the system but to enable the system designer to make educated choices about the most
adequate diagnostic strategy. As domain specific diagnostic strategies are derived, the
complexity of developing a diagnostic strategy will be reduced. The flexibility of the
architecture empowers the designer to diagnose the most simple system - one that
uses a single model and single diagnostic strategy. It also enables the designer the
ability to incrementally add diagnosis blocks to the diagnostic strategy. The level of
complexity can be adjusted by the system designers depending on available resources
and other constraints.
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Figure 3-2: Data Bus Architecture
3.3 Data Bus Architecture
The previous two sections described the hierarchical and hybrid aspects of the sug-
gested architecture. While the primary goal of the architecture is to provide a flexible
and comprehensive diagnostics framework, an adequate architecture also needs a con-
crete illustration of its realization. The realization of the architecture is accomplished
by using a centralized data store that makes the information available to all parties
involved. Fig. 3-2 illustrates the conceptual information sharing architecture.
The topology of the proposed architecture is a bus topology. Other topologies
could also be considered (such as ring and star topologies). However, at this time,
there is no evidence that suggests the superiority of another topology over the bus
topology. The centralized data store could also be implemented using a variety of
methods, including mapped memory, a database and shared files. The method of
choice should be left to the system designer. However, write access to the central re-
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source must be synchronized using a resource sharing mechanism. Such mechanisms
include queued requests, semaphores, and critical sections. An adequate interface
must be designed so as to abstract the data store implementation. If the implementa-
tion is properly abstracted, the actual means to accomplish the shared data facilities
can be easily altered based on preference or performance needs.
The main idea behind the data bus architecture is to distribute the information
to all components and diagnostic blocks in the system. This information includes
signals from components, as well as states, inputs and outputs. Various blocks can
then register themselves as consumers of this information. This way, the information
can be broadcasted to all parties interested. A given component would block write-
access from other components only if it detects a discrepancy and needs to perform
an action that might affect the rest of the system. Otherwise, the information can be
read by all parties concurrently. Obviously, the data store could become a bottleneck
in the system. Care must be taken to design the data store in such a way to meet the
information demands of the diagnosers without influencing the overall performance
of the system. Nevertheless, the hierarchical decomposition still provides the benefits
of mitigating complexity because information gathering is only a small fraction of
the diagnosis task. Information processing and inferring the system status based on
either a model or a knowledge base will still benefit from abstraction and decentralized
processing.
Figure 3-3 illustrates a realization of the data bus topology using the an agent
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architecture (adapted from [20]). This agent architecture will be used as the basis for
the simulation of the architecture in the design environment.
Now that the conceptual architecture has been described, it can be realized in
the simulation environment. Chapter 4 will introduce the simulation environment
and outline how each approach to diagnosis can be implemented in the environment.
Furthermore, it will explain how the environment relates to the data bus architecture
and will supply a general framework for diagnostics in the environment. Chapter 4 will
also outline how the proposed architecture, along with the development environment
can be further realized.
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Chapter 4
ARCHITECTURE
REALIZATION
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the purpose of this chapter is to verify
and validate the adequacy of the proposed architecture. In order to accomplish these
goals, a simulation environment has been selected. The simulation environment se-
lected is SpecTRM (The Specification Toolkit and Requirements Methodology). The
goal of using SpecTRM is to test out the proposed architecture using an appropriate
system modeled in the environment. An overview of the SpecTRM environment is
available in a subsequent section. The second goal of this chapter is to establish
guidelines, on a general level, about how to implement the diagnosis algorithms pre-
sented in Chapter 2 in a simulation environment. SpecTRM has also been selected
as the simulation environment of choice because of its features and because of the
context of this work. Since SpecTRM has been developed and is used in the Complex
Systems Research Laboratory (formerly known as the Software Engineering Research
Laboratory), interests has garnered to display and understand the ability of the tool
to implement diagnostics algorithms. Since SpecTRM and associated research is an
important part of the research conducted in the laboratory, the choice of environment
is justified. However, the environment does provide an adequate platform for simula-
tion and validation because it contains all of the necessary capabilities. Although this
chapter will focus on implementation in SpecTRM, the topics covered in Chapter 2
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and the proposed architecture presented in Chapter 3 are independent of the imple-
mentation platform. In summary, the hope is that demonstrating the architecture in
SpecTRM will educate users of the specific environment and also justify the feasibil-
ity of the approach to users of other environments. Before embarking on a detailed
account, the environment is presented.
4.1 SpecTRM
The Specification and Toolkit Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM) is an environ-
ment for specifying, verifying, and validating requirements for engineering systems.
The environment makes extensive use of the intent specification methodology, out-
lined in source [28]. SpecTRM enables the specification of system requirements at
various levels of granularity, from a high level overview of the system to the imple-
mentation details of each component. The granularity of details is controlled through
the use of specification levels. The refinement of details is carried out as levels are
increased. Level 1 represents the highest level (lowest level of details) and Level 6
represents the lowest level (highest level of details). Blackbox models that capture
the logical interactions between components and various control modes is the focus
of Level 3. The context for this work and for diagnostics in general lie in levels 1, 2,
and 3. However, levels 1 and 2 are primarily concerned with higher level requirements
specified using text. Since the focus of this work is modeling and the application of
algorithms, levels 1 and 2 will not be considered in the context of this work. Level 3
will be the focus of this chapter and of the subsequent chapter. Level 3 provides the
adequate level of details and facilities for the modeling purposes of this work.
SpecTRM proves a viable environment for the simulation of the proposed architec-
ture because it already provides a data bus architecture for exchanging information
between components. Furthermore, the environment enables the modeling of dis-
crete behavior (using truth tables), state-based behavior (also using truth tables,
with slight differences), and continuous behavior (using equations). As a result, the
hybrid dimension of the proposed architecture can be modeled adequately. The devel-
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opment of system models will be done using SpecTRM-RL, the SpecTRM Require-
ments Language. SpecTRM-RL contains all of the necessary elements for creating
blackbox models (and consequently all enumerated behavior models) and for the im-
plementation of the diagnosis algorithms. Moreover, because SpecTRM provides a
component-based environment, it naturally lends itself to the system decomposition
presented in the previous chapter. Consequently, the environment provides the ap-
propriate facilities to implement the hierarchical nature of the proposed architecture.
Moreover, the environment is developed based on the Eclipse platform, a flexible
open source workbench. The Eclipse platform is a fully open development environ-
ment that makes extensive use of the Java plug-in paradigm. The flexibility of the
paradigm enables the development of plug-ins to perform any desired functionality.
While this work will not spend too much time on the implementation of algorithms
using the Java API, it is important to consider this property of the environment be-
cause it allows full flexibility in the simulation environment. Furthermore, SpecTRM
also supplies a set of API facilities that plug-ins can utilize. For more information
about SpecTRM, SpecTRM-RL, the available API facilities, the intent specification
methodology, or the Eclipse Platform, the reader is referred to sources [21,28].
4.2 Realization
In specTRM, most of the modeling is done using truth tables and logic transitions.
However, the conditions evaluated in the truth tables can be full statements such as
the discrete value of a state variable, a timing constraint, conditions on a continu-
ous variable, the value of a function, or any combination of the enumerated types.
Consequently, even though the modeling is achieved through logical correlations, the
conditions are not limited to discrete logic in the traditional sense (where every con-
dition is a logical True/False condition and cannot be an expression). The goal of this
chapter is not to explain how to use SpecTRM, but to illustrate how the diagnostics
strategy can be drafted in SpecTRM. For more information about SpecTRM, the
reader is referred to [21].
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4.2.1 Structure
While the diagnostics strategy will vary greatly based on the system, the diagnostics
infrastructure will take on a fairly consistent structure. The system decomposition
outlined in the previous chapter provides a good starting point on which to allocate
diagnostic responsibilities. The top level presents the summary information of the
diagnostics infrastructure. Typical control modes will include normal operation, safe
mode, and fault detected mode. Moreover, if a fault is detected, the information
needs to be conveyed to the top layer. This is accomplished by using two levels of
information (or, in SpecTRM terms, two states). A summary table of the faulty com-
ponent can be build so that the faulty component can be readily identified. Moreover,
if some of the fault signatures are known, they can be entered in a summary table as
well. Aggregating all of this information from lower level components enables the easy
identification of the fault without having to iterate between all the components. Fig-
ure 4-1 provides a typical diagram, in SpecTRM, of the summary information. The
summary information is driven by component status and other means of detecting
faults. Moreover, gathering all of the information at the top level will ease the process
of reconfiguring the system and applying fault-tolerance methods. The top level infor-
mation will also enable the diagnosis of inter-subsystem and inter-component faults.
While the structure presented in figure 4-1 represents system level summary informa-
tion, a similar aggregation can be performed at the subsystem level using component
level information. If such a hierarchical decomposition is selected, the system level
summary information would contain subsystem information and the subsystem level
summary information would contain component level information.
If a fault is detected but the detected fault does not match any of known fault
signatures, the detected fault will be classified as Unknown and no fault signature
will be identified. Furthermore, the system will enter safe mode. Aggregating the
information at the top level will also ease fault-tolerance and fault reconfiguration
logic at the supervisor level.
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SUPERVISORY MODE INFERRED SYSTEM STATE
System Monitoring Detected Fault Fault Signature
Unknown -Unknown
CONTROL MODE -Component 1 -Component 1 Failure 1
-Failure Det ected 
-Component 2 -Component 1 Failure 2
-Normal 
-Component 3 -Component 1 Failure 3
-Safe 
-Component 2 Failure 1
-Component 2 Failure 2
Figure 4-1: Diagnostics Architecture Structure
4.2.2 Approaches
With the architecture structure laid down, this section will focus on explaining how
the various approaches outlined in Chapter 2 can be implemented in the simulation
environment.
Signal Processing
The implementation of the signal processing strategy is quite simple. The assumption
is that the system has already been modeled using the appropriate equations and that
sensor readings are available to compute the relevant residuals. For the context of this
work, the residual is simply the subtraction of the expected value of the signal from
the sensor reading (absolute value of the difference). For a continuous component,
the state transition table would look something like figure 4-2. The modeled behavior
does not contain behavior transitions besides the proper fault detection logic (other
logical behavior would need to be added). Additions to the signal processing approach
can include filter blocks to the measured signal (for example, Kalman filters). The
Kalman filters can be implemented using the Java API to enable more sophisticated
signal processing capabilities. Filters can be supplied as extra blocks in the data bus
architecture, or as intermediate blocks between sensor measurements and the data
bus. The summary and extensions section will explain in greater details how the
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= Unknown
Control Mode is Unknown T
= Normal
Control Mode is Normal
Residual <= Epsilon
= Failed
Residual > Epsilon
Residual > Epsilon for at Least T Seconds
Control Mode is Unknown
Figure 4-2: Diagnosis using a Signal Processing Approach
environment can be extended to supply more sophisticated capabilities.
Constraint Suspension
Constraint suspension involves a few more transition tables, one for suspending the
constraints of each component. Referring back to the example in figure 2-3, and
using the probabilities outlined in the figure to discriminate between the possible
candidates, a subset of the fault transition tables is outlined in figure 4-3. The out-
line contains only the fault detection conditions for the OR 1 gate. The transition
tables are not complete but provide a snapshot of the logic needed to perform con-
straint suspension. Part of the problem with implementing the Constraint Suspension
algorithm in SpecTRM is that it requires a rather large number of truth tables. How-
ever, the hierarchical decomposition can reduce the number of necessary truth tables
if the decomposition is chose carefully.
Discrete Event Systems
To illustrate how the discrete system approach can be implemented in SpecTRM,
we refer back to the pump/valve example described in Chapter 2. The valve can be
in any of 4 states (OPEN, CLOSED, FAILEDOPEN, FAILED-CLOSED) and the
pump can be in any of 4 states as well (ON, OFF, FAILED-ON, FAILEDOFF).
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= Unknown
Control Mode is Unknown
= Normal
Input 1 is HIGH
Input 2 is HIGH
Input 3 is HIGH
Input 4 is HIGH
Input 5 is HIGH
Input 6 is HIGH
Output 1 is HIGH
Output 2 is HIGH
= Failed
Input 1 is HIGH
Input 2 is HIGH
Input 3 is HIGH
Input 4 is HIGH
Input 5 is HIGH
Input 6 is HIGH
Output 1 is HIGH
Output 2 is HIGH
F
F
T
T
T
Figure 4-3: Diagnosis using Constraint Suspension
50
T
T
T
Table 4.1: Global Sensor Map for Uniquely Identifiable Failures
Pump State Valve State Sensor at Pump Sensor at Valve
FAILEDON ANY HIGH ANY
FAILED-OFF ANY HIGH ANY
ON FAILED-CLOSED HIGH LOW
ON FAILEDOPEN HIGH HIGH
FAILEDON FAILED-CLOSED HIGH LOW
FAILEDON FAILED-OPEN HIGH HIGH
There are 2 sensors, one at the pump and one at the valve. The possible sensor
readings are HIGH or LOW. Figure 4-4 shows the behavior of the pump component.
The main points to take away from this example are the failure signatures and how
they are represented using truth tables. The global sensor map for the example
is illustrated in table 4.1 (adapted from [12]). The table contains only the global
sensor map entries for failures that are uniquely identifiable (including multiple fault
signatures). It is important to consider that this table does not automatically match
a fault signature with a state, but it matches a fault signature and an expected
state with the state. For example, in the first row of the table, given the history of
commands, the pump is expected to be OFF. However, given that the sensor at the
pump reads HIGH, it is clear that the pump has failed in the ON state (hence the
FAILEDON mapping). The multiple failure scenarios are a bit more complex since
they involve the combination of 2 sensor readings in conjunction with the expected
state. Important modeling characteristics are also illustrated in the table. In order
to correctly diagnose the state of the valve, the pump must be in the ON state or in
the FAILED-ON state. Otherwise, no relevant information can be extracted about
the state of the valve. Another interesting point to note in this example is that
the modeling should probably contain an extra state for the valve and for the pump
to reflect novel and unknown failures. The unknown state would be entered when
unexpected behavior is observed and the unexpected behavior cannot be matched
with known expected state and failure mode combinations. Although including the
unknown failure state is somewhat of a modeling preference, it remains an important
facility to hanlde novel faults.
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= Unknown
Control Mode is Unknown
On
Last Command Sent is TurnOn
Time since Last Command Sent is Greater than 10 secondsl
Last State is Off
Sensor at Pump Reads HIGH
Off
Last Command Sent is TurnOff
Time since Last Command Sent is Greater than 10 seconds
Last State is On
Sensor at Pump Reads LOW
FailedOn
Last Command Sent is TurnOff
Time since Last Command Sent is Greater than 10 seconds
Last State is On
Sensor at Pump Reads HICH
FailedOff
Last Command Sent is TurnOn
Time since Last Command Sent is Greater than 10 seconds
Last State is Off
Sensor at Pump Reads LOW
Figure 4-4: Diagnosis using Discrete Event Systems
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4.2.3 The Java API
While the sophistication of the diagnosis algorithm is highly dependent on the gran-
ularity of the model, the SpecTRM environment provides the necessary flexibility to
control the level of granularity. However, as evidenced by the examples illustrated in
the preceding sections, the state-based nature of the environment makes it difficult
to incorporate trajectory tracking or to include more sophisticated signal processing
techniques. Furthermore, the environment makes it difficult to understand involved
algorithms such as constraint suspension (because of the large number of truth ta-
bles). Some of these limitations can be overcome by the openness of the environment.
Since the environment is built on the Eclipse platform, it provides an open envi-
ronment where Java plug-ins can be easily integrated. Furthermore, the SpecTRM
development environment also supplies a set of API calls that can be used to access
various parts of the model. By utilizing the Java API, more sophisticated algorithms
can be developed and features such as trajectory tracking can be implemented. For
more information on the Java API, the reader is referred to source [21].
4.3 Summary and Extensions
While the models presented do not constitute complete models in SpecTRM, they
nevertheless represent important sample realizations of the algorithms presented in
Chapter 2. Since the proposed architecture should resemble a plug-and-play envi-
ronment, it would be interesting and helpful to provide diagnostics capabilities in a
toolbox fashion within the SpecTRM environment. In order to do so, the Java API
should be utilized to provide a wizard and a step-by-step environment to define the
diagnostics strategy. To do so, commonalities of the approaches should be captured
in a parameterized environment so that each approach can be supplied in a fill-in-the-
blanks fashion. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to consider how to reuse
the diagnostics capabilities. Reuse is one of the cited benefits of the SpecTRM envi-
ronment. However, since the diagnostics capabilities are often at a level higher than
components, the potential for reuse is questionable. Certainly, the diagnostics capa-
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bilities packaged with individual components can be reused. However, the bulk of the
logic and the reconfiguration capabilities exist at a level higher than the components
and hence cannot be easily reused. The reuse can happen in a domain specific devel-
opment environment where best practices are clearly established. Chapter 5 provides
the conclusion based on this work and some suggestions for future research areas to
expand on this work.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this research was to provide a flexible diagnostics framework
to meet the requirements of modern engineering systems. The key points of modern
engineering systems remain the heterogeneity of systems and the increasing com-
plexity of typical systems. The presented research supplied a literature review of the
popular approaches to diagnosis. Those approaches were presented, analyzed, and the
benefits and applications of the approaches were summarized in Chapter 2. In order
to meet the complexity challenges of engineering systems, a hierarchical diagnostics
framework was presented based on a system decomposition methodology. The pro-
posed architecture also addressed the heterogeneity challenges of engineering systems
by supplying a flexible framework to enable different approaches to modeling and
diagnosis to coexist. The resulting proposed architecture is the hierarchical hybrid
architecture explained in Chapter 3. Furthermore, in order to realize the architecture,
a data bus representation of the architecture was also presented. The data bus ar-
chitecture enables the flexible framework to coexist in a plug-and-play environment.
Finally, Chapter 4 presented a simulation environment, SpecTRM, as a viable devel-
opment and verification test bed for the proposed architecture. How to implement the
proposed approaches was illustrated using the SpecTRM environment. Furthermore,
suggestions were made about how the environment can be further utilized to achieve
the desired functionality.
A more thorough model highlighting the benefits of the architecture could not be
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fully completed for this work but will be completed as continued research. However,
this work has set some important foundations on which future work can be based. The
first extension would be to develop a complete model in the SpecTRM environment
that demonstrates the hybrid and hierarchical features of the proposed architecture.
Furthermore, more work could be done to package the diagnosis approaches into a
toolbox. The benefits of a toolbox would be to provide the diagnostics set up fa-
cilities via a wizard to abstract some of the mechanisms used by the environment.
Furthermore, research should be conducted to determine the possibility of providing
the diagnostics framework in the form of a diagnosis engine component. The compo-
nent could be developed and added to the environment in the form of a Java plug-in.
More sophisticated facilities (for example Kalman filters) could also be developed and
provided as functionality blocks via the Java API. These suggestions concern mostly
the realization of the proposed architecture in the simulation environment. However,
this research also lays some important ground work for further study in the theoretical
aspects of diagnosis.
This work was concerned mostly with the automated aspects of diagnosis. While
the automated aspects are important, another important aspect concerns diagnosis
with humans in the loop. For many systems, troubleshooting and diagnosis must be
performed remotely by humans, without direct access to the relevant system. The sys-
tem design greatly affects what can and cannot be diagnosed remotely. Analogously
to automated diagnosis, systems can be designed so that they can be diagnosed by
humans. How to do so would require combining diagnosis theory with human factors,
cognitive engineering, and human-computer interaction. Furthermore, most diagnosis
implementation will probably divide responsibilities between humans and automation.
The exact task division will depend on the system at hand, but the interaction be-
tween humans and automation make this problem of particular interest to the human
factors community. The human component in the diagnosis task can be modeled as
an extra component in the databus architecture. However, one of the main challenges
of performing diagnosis with humans in the loop remains how to represent the infor-
mation to ease the role of the human. The role of the human includes understanding
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how a given automated diagnosis was reached (to decide on the best course of action)
or how to interpret sensor information alongside a model to perform diagnosis (either
mentally or through the use of decision support tools). Diagnosis with humans in the
loop represent an important topic and will be the source of further research within
the context of this work.
Furthermore, the diagnostics capabilities of a system are highly dependent on
the system design. Currently, no methods exist to evaluate diagnosability capabil-
ities of a given system design and to understand how to design systems that can
perform desired diagnostics functions. An adequate diagnosis design platform would
incorporate these facilities while enabling design iterations and evaluation of different
designs. Another interesting topic would be to research how diagnostics strategies
can be reused. The benefits of component-based specification reuse has been argued
at length. However, it would be interesting to learn whether those concepts could be
extended to diagnostics capabilities as well.
In summary, the work presented here can serve as a basis for the suggested expan-
sions for future research. The work is generic enough to be widely applicable to the
field of diagnosis as a whole and specific enough to be implemented in the context of
a simulation environment or a design platform.
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